Late last year, the Turkish government unveiled a bold plan to stabilize the lira. The basic idea was to encourage the public to hold their money in the domestic currency by promising higher returns if it continued to weaken. But can it work? On this episode we spoke with Paul McNamara, a veteran EM fund manager at GAM, to get his perspective.
Joe Weisenthal:
Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast. I'm Joe Weisenthal. Unfortunately, my colleague Tracy Alloway is out today, so it will just be me, but I'm very excited nonetheless about this episode because we are going to continue speaking about one of the more interesting and complicated stories developing right now in markets. And that is the situation in Turkey.
And if you haven't already, a couple weeks ago, we published an episode with the economist based at a bank in Istanbul, basically walking through some of the measures that the Erdogan government has taken recently to stabilize the lira. And of course the Lira had a pretty terrible 2021. It feels like, as we said on that episode, that every nine months, every year, every year and a half, there's a pretty big episode in Turkey where the currency plunges and the government engages in seemingly unorthodox monetary policy.
Nonetheless, none of it seems to have helped. Inflation is extremely high. And so the argument is, or the attempt by the government is to discourage domestic savers from moving their money into dollars and to hold their money in lira. So far, you know, this has been a, a goal for a while.
Turkey is a heavily dollarized economy by and large and nothing has worked. So I would encourage people to listen to that episode for a discussion of the mechanics, but of course, anything new is bound to be very controversial. And there's a lot of views and a lot of skepticism about whether anything will improve with the new measures. Uh, and so we wanna continue on, on the topic. And of course in the last episode, we spoke to an economist at a Turkish bank.
But this time we wanted to get the a perspective that’s more international from the international investing community. And I'm extremely excited about our guest he's been on the podcast two or three times in the past often helping us understand what's going on in the EM. And I think we we've even talked Turkey specifically before, maybe in 2018 or 2019, nonetheless very excited to welcome back to the show. Paul McNamara, he's an investment director at GAM, a longtime specialist in emerging markets. And so we are going to dive right in. Paul welcome back to Odd Lots.
Paul McNamara:
Thanks very much.
Joe:
Before we even get to the current measures and the current mechanisms that the government has put in place to attempt to stabilize the Lira. How would you characterize the long term issues facing the country? Why is it in your view that we seemingly come back to Turkey in particular? I don't know, every year or every year and a half during some episode of a high inflation and extreme currency, volatile,
Paul:
It's something that tends to be particularly true of countries, which have a habit of getting themselves into trouble. Turkey isn't remotely in as much trouble as Argentina, but the mindset there is the same is that if you know, a country is prone to, you know, 15, 20% or more in the currency to overnight huge rises in, in interest rates or big drops in bond prices, you tend to be to react much faster. And this goes as much for, you know, people with a bit of money in the bank.
Do they switch their money from liras to dollars or back again, or take their money out of the, you know, when you get this much volatility, it kind of creates its own volatility because people feel the need to react much faster. And just that willingness to react more quickly kind of creates sort of enhances the volatility. So you get into this kind of volatility promoting spiral.
Joe:
Now, how much of this spiral would you say is a function of say domestic institutions? And of course people perceive the Erdogan government to be engaged in, I would say highly unorthodox views of how monetary policy works, lowering rates, blaming high rates for high inflation, et cetera. How much of this spiral is sort of the government dis inclination towards more Orthodox policies versus sort of more behavioral explanations on the part of, uh, Turkish savers and their dis inclination to hold li like what, what is why in particular, does Turkey seem to exhibit this, this doom loop?
Paul:
I think it's really interesting because it's, it's kind of unusual to have a crisis which is largely voluntary. It's not like you have to do some sort of thought experiment, you know, that what would be the counterfactual if Turkey had higher interest rates? Because we know that that before under the previous head of the central bank, we had much higher interest rates and we had a lira that had been appreciating solidly for a couple of months. So in terms of the trigger for this, this particular situation, it's entirely, I think on the, on the shoulders of the government that they decided that they were going to, you sort of play play games, side think is, is maybe a little bit casual, but they decided that, you know, that they could conduct a complete experiment in monetary policy.
I mean, I think there are longer term reasons why Turkey has been particularly prone to boom/bust cycle. It's a country where the external deficit, you know, dips on a regular basis into deficit... into very substantial deficit. It's got much lower level of foreign exchange reserves than, you know, pretty much any of the other big, EMS except maybe South Africa, you know, so it, it has fewer natural safeguards. I think the history of the volatility makes the, the consequences of policy experiments more serious, but, you know, primarily the, you know, the, the recent, huge bout of volatility was a political choice by the government.
Joe:
So why is that when we talk about these EMs, that flare up of the news from time to time and Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, uh, from time to time, what is it structurally and you mentioned the lack of foreign exchange reserves and the sort of the thin cushion that the country has. Is there something about the way the Turkish economy is structured in terms of domestic industry and so forth, such that it maintains these vulnerabilities and in your view, does a policy exist that could reverse some of these factors?
Paul:
I think the, the very substantial role for foreign currency and especially the us dollar is, is definitely something that makes Turkey much more vulnerable. You know, that depositors regularly switch their money between Lira and dollars, uh, depending on, you know, what they perceive the outlook for the currency to be, but probably more, more important is that an awful lot of the onshore debt is in us dollars. So not only do Turkish depositors keep a decent chunk of their savings in, well, we'll, I'll keep saying dollars. I mean, it does in include, especially euros. There's a few other currencies, but we'll say dollars for simplicity is that, uh, not just genuine debt, I mean, debt owed to external institutions, but also unsure the Turkish banks lend dollars to domestic borrowers. And if you owed, if you owe a lot of dollars and the Lira plunges, then you, you're going to end up chasing the Le, right.
And that's especially true. If, if you are say running real state or something like that, something without a natural stream of dollars. I mean, if you are a big exporter, then I think it makes a lot of sense. Your revenues are in dollars. It makes a lot of sense to have your debt in dollars. Sure. But in Turkey, you know it’s got a big, not always vibrant real estate sector, you know, it, it for a couple of years is, I mean it, before COVID the share of real estate construction was ticking up towards the level we saw before the Euro crisis in places like Spain. And if you are borrowing dollars without a natural source of dollars, then, then the very big role of the dollar of in the economy is going to create volatility in itself. Because it does mean that when the dollar strengthens, instead of making people look, oh, the dollar is expensive. I won't buy some now. Yeah. It's “I desperately need these dollars.” And if it moves even more, I'm gonna be even further underwater. So I think the big role of the dollar, not just on the deposit side, but also on the debt side is very important there.
Joe:
This gets to our discussion in our last episode in Turkey, which is people look at Turkey and they say, okay, what's, what's all this, you know, cutting interest rates where they should be hiking them and diminishing the independence of the central bank stacking the central bank and so forth. But how much is the core issue, really the high level of dollarization. And is there an argument that nothing can be solved or no stability can be achieved until that's reversed in some manner.
Paul:
It's fairly clear that, you know that the high level of dollarization creates more volatility, it makes any bad policy decision, any big external change, you know, be it a spike in the oil price or something like that. It will generate more volatility in a highly dollarized economy like Turkey. But, you know, I mean, dollarization is by no means unique to Turkey, you know, that we've seen, I mean, most of the economies of central Europe were to a, a significant degree, maybe not to the same degree as Turkey, you know, oriented to, you know, first the Deutschemark and, and later the Euro, you know, there was a huge role for foreign debt in the, the Asian financial crisis. Going back a bit further, a lot of Latin America still has a significant role of dollar for dollarization, but you know, an awful lot of countries across the emerging world have managed to reduce the level of dollarization in their economies and that, and that happens when they just manage to maintain macroeconomic stability.
I mean, the one thing we haven't mentioned ix inflation. But the current crash or whatever you wanna call it is primarily about inflation. I mean, nobody really cares that much, you know, there, there there's no suggestion, if you look globally that foreign investors demand a certain level of real, of real interest rates, generally mm-hmm to, to put money into a foreign economy or that you domestics will always prefer to have, you know, to hold foreign currency, if real interest rates get too low. In the specific situation we have here, where inflation is, is, well, I mean, even before the latest round of nightmarish numbers, inflation was already very high and have this perception that, that any sort of Orthodox policy, or not even, or even an unorthodox policy, which had some kind of logic behind it, you know, that there was no possibility of, of anything like that.
What's kind of creating its own kind of spiral because we saw the big drop in the lira and the result of that is that the latest CPI that was announced was 36% year on year, including 13.5% percent in one month. And the PPI is 80%. I mean, this is inflation ticking up from sort of nuisance and, you know, minor to dis disruptive factor to that becomes a real problem that makes taking economic decisions, even with a horizon of a few months, really very difficult. The key problem is not, oh, you know, interest rates are here rather than there it's that, uh, inflation is very, very high. And the government either doesn't have a clue or doesn't care
Joe:
On inflation specifically. I mean, how much is this is just, I guess I would say the inverse of the Lira. And so how much of it is passed through from imports. And so mechanistically when the lira weakens inflation goes up, et cetera, or are there other dynamics at play?
Paul:
There’s a lot of other stuff at work. I mean, you know, as a very, very loose rule of thumb, the estimate of the passthrough, you know, is very roughly about quarter or somewhere between a quarter and a fifth. So if you get a 10% drop in the lira, then that'll probably add somewhere between two and two and a half percent to inflation.
So it's part of it, but the factors which are at work everywhere else in the world, which is, you know, a huge buildup of cash balances, both firms and at individual and household levels, people being pushed out of the economy and then suddenly kind of coming back bottlenecks big rise in oil prices because right, all, uh, energy effectively Turkey's energy needs are imported, uh, which is, which is quite unusual in EM. So the, the lyric is a very important part of it. It's a particularly important part in the recent big spike, but it's overlaid on a general global reflationary picture, which I think it may effect Turkey more than more than a lot of others as well. And of course, you've got stuff like the government just pushed through very big rise in the minimum wage. For example, you know, there's inflationary factors all over
Joe:
Zoom out for a second. And you mentioned that of course have dollarization is not unique to Turkey, so it's a factor, but it can't explain everything. And you noted that other EMs either have been able to deal with dollarization it hasn't created the same level of volatility, or they've actually been able to reduce dollarization over time. What's worked like, is there a playbook more broadly setting aside Turkey? What would work? Is there a consistent playbook that you've seen in your career watching different ones where it's like, yes, this is a, this has been a path towards reducing, uh, the dollarization and the, the risk it comes with that. Yeah.
Paul:
I mean, it's extremely simple macro stability. I mean, obviously inflation coming down and staying down. It looked as if Turkey was well on this course. I mean, actually the best part of a decade ago. Now, when they got inflation well down and persistently into single digits, then you start to see the currency stabilized. You see real appreciation. It's not just a question of inflation. You need to have the banking sector seen as safe. You need to see government debt seen as effectively risk free locally, but in a word stability. If domestic institutions are stable if domestic macro variables are stable, then people don't want the uncertainty of owning a foreign currency. because then owning foreign currency becomes a two way risk. You get the domestic currency appreciating and the it's, then it's the, the holders of foreign currency who get hit very hard.
A particularly good example is what happened in Poland and Hungary from the other side, when people who'd taken mortgages in Swiss franc in particular, but in foreign, the volatility between foreign currencies and local currencies makes both borrowers and lenders want to prefer domestic currency, not on the grounds of wanting a directional move that looks after them, but just on the grounds of certainty that you will not, you know, even in somewhere like Poland or Hungary, you can comfortably get to move in Euro lot, or Euro Euro foreign of five, six, 7%. And, and people don't want that uncertainty. So I mean, the, the natural preferences for people to, to use as their unit of count the domestic currency, and you need Turkish level disruption to chase people out of the domestic currency,
Joe:
This gets into when people pinpoint Erdogan, or when they talk about the diminishing independence of the central bank, or the frequent changing of central bankers or ministerial posts. This is where you would say, it sounds like is a real negative contributing factor, essentially, essentially the uncertainty factor.
Paul:
Yeah. I think it's an attitude of, of the government want kind of wants to have its cake and eat it, that they, they want low inflation, but they also want high growth. They want financial conditions, which are good for the property sector, but, you know, for rich people generally, and they don’t recognize that there are trade offs in economics.
I mean, specifically the idea that the best way to reduce inflation is to cut interest rates, you know, which has been repeated and actually loud amplified as we went through December. It just adds to the volatility in it, you know, and, and it's the same thing that they've intervened very heavily. We think that the intervention, since the last couple of weeks of November was ticking up towards 20 billion and know, and, and gross reserves are, you know, are what about 120, 130, uh, billion dollars, neve rmind net that they've been running these big swap books with the domestic banks, which distort the, the usefulness for the figures that, uh, under the previous, well, a couple of finance ministers ago, the state banks were de intervening to keep the layer stable. It's this incoherent mismatch of ideas based on the idea that things are only really going wrong from Turkey in Turkey because of foreigners, especially people like me and not because they have a policy set up that is designed to produce inflation.
Joe:
So let's get to some of the more recent moves. And it seems like the core idea. And again, we discussed this recently is how do give people, you know, obviously there and you, you laid it out in the beginning as well. There's this people are very quick to buy more dollars and there is this sort of loop that happens. The dollar strengthens, people wanna buy more to you get ahead these very extreme moves, very rapid in, uh, dollar/lira and that's of course destabilizing.
So the idea for the government that the government is like, how do you give people protect protection without encouraging them to move to dollars? And so, okay, we're going to, the basic idea is we are going to pay you, you, you keep your money in lirafor a certain amount of time. And if the lira weekends during that will compensate you by giving, giving you more lira what is your sort of initial read on, uh, the, these types of programs or this program in particular?
Paul:
It looks kind of incoherent. I mean, there's, there's an attempt to check range people's expectations, you know, and thus create a kind of a virtuous circle that people will move their money out of dollars into li yeah. Stabilize the banking system and, and it will work fine, you know, and, and if you could just somehow spontaneously make people start shifting their money out of dollars into li creating a bid for lira stabilize the currency, bring inflation down. Uh, you could see how that, how this would work. The trouble is that this is, and, and I think your previous interviewee made the same point that this is the government writing effectively, uh, put options on the, now, if you write a, an at the money put option on the layer right now, it's gonna cost you about 11% of the sum insured, even if kind of you know, layer of volatility or implied volatility goes down to the, the lowest levels it's been for the last couple of years, it's still gonna cost you somewhere close to 5% of the amount.
So this is the government writing a very, very valuable put option for free, right? And that's, you know saw something similar with the Irish government deciding to guarantee its banks, right in 2008 on the basis that if people believe the government stands behind the banks, they won't pull their money out of the banks, you know, and they, and therefore the banks won't need protecting.
And it, and it's effectively a free option, a free bit of underwriting, right? I mean, what happened in Ireland in is of course that the banks were were basically unsafe at any speed, you know, that, that no matter who, you know, and that the Irish government clearly couldn't really afford, to underwrite the banking sector as it was.
So all you really got was effectively a free lunch for the existing debtors of Anglo Irish bank who got fully repaid. And so the worry is this, that this is, this is an option that the, that the Turkish, and if you look at it like this, I mean, the logic would be that around half the Turkish deposit base right now is, is in dollars. It comes out at something like a hundred, billion dollars, the lira moved 50% sort of peaked to trough or not even peaked to trough 50% move in about a month.
There's no way the Turkish government can afford to pay for moves of that magnitude. The idea of making a guarantee and therefore it never happens to be, never has to be used is, is obviously quite attractive, but you have to have some sort of logic that if the guarantee does have to be used, uh, it's it, it's not going to make everybody's credit worth. And then you, you just have the, the, the banks contaminating, what is still a, a pretty mu a pretty clean government balance sheet. Yeah.
Joe:
I mean, this seems to be the key point, because we have seen over the years, various governments or central banks essentially make a blanket promise and many, and the successful ones never actually end up being used. And the one that you mentioned, Irish government, but the one that really stands out to my mind as highly effective was Mario Draghi’s OMT when they said that if a country gets into financial trouble, and if it's willing to undergo a program of restructuring then the ECB will backstop its debt.
And that closed spreads extremely fast and no country ever actually entered into a program. And the OMT was never used, but regardless it was an extremely successful program. We saw it similarly here in March 2020 with the Fed offering a backstop for cities and states that got into trouble in the end, that basically did the trick. I think a couple localities ended up using it, but by and large the mechanism wasn't used much, you know, obviously the ECB and the Fed, you can't beat them.
Paul:
You can't beat the Fed in dollars. You can't beat the ECB in euros. Right. But what the Turks are saying is that, you know, they're effectively underwriting a dollar debt. I mean, whether or not they say they're paying it in lira doesn't really matter. It means that they're underwriting a dollar debt and the central bank of Turkey cannot print dollars.
Joe:
So in theory, they're only guaranteeing you lira, so technically they're not, they're not guaranteeing you dollars, but if they're guaranteeing a level of lira-dollar stability, which I think is how you'd character then de facto, they're trying to, they're promising to give you some sort they're, they're implicitly offering to sort of pay dollars. It seems like, and that is something that neither the government nor the central bank can do.
Paul:
I mean, one of the reasons you want to hold your, you are willing to hold lira is that it, you can freely convert it into dollars at any time. If we get it to the point where you have a dollar lira spiral that is threatening, you know, that that is moving the way it was in December. The last thing you want to be doing is printing huge amounts of Lira and giving those to people, right? Because then they'll just rush out. And then when, when the time comes, they'll buy dollar and make the spiral worse.
Joe:
It seems like to me that the nightmare scenario would be that you get significant takeup of the new accounts, but not significant enough such that it actually puts a floor into the lyric. So in theory of everyone were to put their lyric into these locked accounts. It seems to me that that could have a stabilizing effect, but it see also is if you put, have a lot of people putting their money in these accounts, but not enough, you could still have significant layer weakness. And the payout gets triggered such that the government is then forced to print more li accelerating the downward spiral. Yeah.
Paul:
I mean, the all argument is if you compare it to an insurance contract, I mean, the way the conventional insurance is, you know, you insure your car. If somebody sets fire to your car, we'll, we'll give you the money. But what these guys are saying or what the Turkish authorities are effectively saying is, you know, if we insure your car, we will make it much less likely that your car catches fire. But if your car catches fire, then we'll set fire to your house as well. Is that the consequences of, of a big dollar layer spiral become worse through the existence of these insurance contracts, of these financial products, they might make a crisis, uh, less likely, but if a crisis does happen, it's, um, it, it's going to be much worse because the sovereign balance sheet is, is contaminated as well. And your printing layer at the very worst time to be printing more layer.
Joe:
What are you watching for in the weeks ahead to see if some sense of stability is going to be achieved? Or if, you know, we'll see a further downward spiral.
Paul:
Well, I mean, two things. One is just what happens to the lira by itself, because obviously we saw this massive, something like a 30% intra day move. Now the interesting thing, or the relevant thing to us is at the time, people saying, well, everybody's clearly buying in into this idea. It's going to work, but it's, you know, it subsequently turned out that there was very, very heavy intervention by the Turkey central bank, even while the speech was taking place and presumably timed in order to coincide. I mean, I mean, I've seen various, uh, estimates, but most of them, you know, on the day alone, and this is after markets had local markets had shut it's about 6:00 PM London. So kind of eight, 9% local time that the, that the, the central bank kind of put somewhere between four and 5 billion in you sort of to, to buy up Le and that thus ramping the li very, very much.
And it would be interesting to see, you know, just can the Lira staying these improved valuations even without, but the, the, the other thing that we think is, is, is probably more of a medium term variable and, and will drive other things is domestic credit growth because the re you know, it's, it's not just a question of what's the level of interest rates. It's also the quantity of new credit and Turkey's problems. Certainly since the global financial price crisis have always coincided with a, with growth in domestic lending. But, uh, it doesn't really matter if it's layers or dollars is that lending picks up activity picks up that creates demand for imports. It also creates leakage into, into dollars, and it tend who weaken the currency. So what we need to see, I think above all is monetary discipline, not so not just in terms of the actual level of interest rates, both the policy rates and effective rates. It's, it's very hard to see how a level of credit growth compatible with strong domestic demand growth is also compatible with L of stability.
Joe:
You know we're still in the middle of a pandemic globally, and obviously even in the us, you know, there's inflation is elevated right now. And there's a hope that when things normalize, whatever that means that, you know, inflation will moderate, how much of the stress on, uh, Turkey's economy is in part, a extreme version of what many places are seeing. And in theory, should moderate somewhat just if, uh, you know, the health situation and the global travel situation, the business situation were to begin to normalize.
Paul:
I mean, specifically for Turkey, a coronavirus situation is terribly important because a tourist season is incredibly important to their balance of payments. So, you know, if, if the, this summer looks like 2021 or better, that's very positive for Turkey. If it looks like 2020, then you know, then really that's seriously problematic for Turkey. I mean, in terms of the global forces, you know, I mean, Turkey is unusual in terms of relying on external energy for, for essentially all its energy needs. So very high oil price, the very high gas prices, that those are a big negative, but I think, you know, Turkey's inflation in the mid thirties is a point where, yeah, they can't just rely on external factors to bail them out. They need to get the policy mix more right than it's been so far. I know that your previous interviewee was much more positive on the, on, on the new savings plan than I am, but it's going to require policymaker in action. Even in the most benevolent scenario, if they keep doing what they're doing, they will be able to have a crisis.
Joe:
So at some point, you know, in theory, a currency weakens significantly that crushes imports, I guess it makes exports more competitive, tourism, maybe a few other industries, how do things stabilize?
And, you know, obviously, look, we can, we could talk about how rough things are and the problems of policy, but at some point, whether we're talking about the currency or whether we're talking about real assets in the economy, you know, something becomes a buy and if you wait for good things to emerge, perhaps it's too late, what do you look for? And not just Turkey and specifically, but, you know, in other sort of like EMS really like, uh, hit rough times, what do you look for to see, uh, inflection points? And when it's like, yes, it's still really bad, but it's all, you know, priced in whatever that means. Yeah.
Paul:
I mean, inflection inflection points tend to be much more about what's going on than valuations. Uh, I mean, there, there is no absolute level for a dollar owed by Turkey. You know, I mean, at the moment the external debt is trading close enough to par that makes no difference, but, you know, it's not, there's no feeling that, you know, a dollar debt price of 30 cents and the dollar, a Turkish layer rate, that's 40% below long term trend. There's no absolute level of valuation that on its own constitutes are buy. And you can see this, for example, in the, in the really extreme cases, places like Lebanon or Venezuela or Argentina. And I absolutely am not saying that turkeys in the same classes, those countries, but you can't rely on valuation alone to make the case to buy you. Do we do need to find a situation where we think that the Turkish situation is sustainable.
That could be any, you know, it could be one that I'm wrong that inflation peaks start to drift down that, you know, that that president Han can do a, a victory lap. And while I'm looking for a new job, you know, it can be just that things start getting better by themselves. It could be at the other extreme that they have to close the banks or ration depositers or convert dollar dollar deposits into none of which I'm saying is particularly likely. I'm just kind of presenting very, very extreme cases of, of what could happen. I don't think, you know, this sort of crash scenario is likely at all, but what we do need to see is something like the lyric stabilizing and at the moment, you know, with, with, with still half the deposit base in L as long as the L is this volatile, I don't think volatility will continue to be self-sustaining. It's not about valuations. You need some way or other to get to a level where, where the country moves to a sustainable footing where inflation stops rising the currency stabilizes. And so on,
Joe:
Before we go, you mentioned the ongoing pandemic, what is your broader view? As we look to 2022. A lot of people expect more rate hikes, began to get priced in for 2022. US risk assets, once again, continue to outperform the world. What is your sort of like broader thinking in the EM landscape and beyond?
Paul:
This is going to sound like a terribly predictable answer, but, you know, as long as the Fed remains hawkish and, you know, I think three hikes this year, uh, I mean, might not be hawkish by some standards, but, you know, it's still seen as a, as a hawkish, that's a difficult environment, free air, and it's a difficult environment. It, for anybody who's only, you know, we air a stronger dollar is a problem. You know, the, the, the ideal thing would be a big growth recovery outside the us because when, when, when growth is very us centric, as it basically, you know, almost always is that tends to be a strong dollar environment. And that tends to be a difficult environment 3m to, to prosper in. But I think, you know, number one, the fed and number two growth, even in the developed world, but outside the us are what we are most focused on.
Joe:
Well, Paul, it is always a pleasure to speak to you on Odd Lots. This was extremely helpful context on Turkey. So, thank you for coming on.
Paul:
Thanks very much.
Joe:
Well, obviously Tracy's not here, so I can't go back and forth with her. But we certainly got two different takes on the Lira and what's going on in Turkey.
The first one was a little bit more optimistic about the government ability to encourage domestic savers to hold their money in lira... to essentially use that ability to write a put option to discourage more dollarization however, as Paul noted, you know, the issue with the government writing such an option in this case is that unlike say with the ECB or the Fed, you know, they're not, it's not strictly a matter are printing the own currency because the implicit promise is to hold the lyric stable relative to the dollar. And so it's a little trickier, but I would've found it very useful. I don't have a side, obviously I'm just a journalist, but I found it very useful to get multiple perspectives and maybe we'll talk more Turkey, but I found it useful to get bulk multiple perspectives because as the cliche goes, that's what makes a market.